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Abstract
In this report, the use of knowledge-theoretic principles to analyse
Wireless Sensor Networks and design protocols is examined. Nodes in
the network are viewed as knowledge-agents which are able to evaluate
formulas using a knowledge-model of the network, and make informed
decisions during the run time of a knowledge based data transmission
protocol. Such a protocol compares with standard data transmission
protocols in terms of resource consumption, protocol overhead, and
whether or not the protocol can be veriﬁed. Such knowledge-theoretic
protocols seem to improve some aspects of network performance, but
they have a potential drawback of a large protocol overhead of the
data structures needed for manipulating knowledge. It is thus inter-
esting to further investigate appropriate knowledge models and design
methodologies for Wireless Sensor Network protocols that will provide
a tradeoﬀ between systematic protocol design, performance, resource
consumption, and protocol overhead.
1 Introduction
Sensor networks have been used in industry for monitoring purposes for
many years. Systems using CCTV cameras, smoke detectors, heat sensors
and so on are part of everyday life. Lately, advances in MicroElectroMe-
chanical Systems, wireless networking, the growth in semiconductor technol-
ogy and the miniaturization of energy capacity have enabled sensors to be
miniaturized and communication to become wireless, thus enabling Wire-
less Sensor Networks (WSNs) to emerge. A WSN is a unique distributed
system, which consists of a collection of nodes which monitor the physical
environment and wirelessly communicate by exchanging messages.
These networks diﬀer from other kinds of ad hoc distributed systems
since they have very limited resources, can be quite unpredictable due to
their close relation with the physical environment, are more prone to failures,
and use a data centric paradigm [1]. Research has focused on designing and
implementing new protocols and services for WSNs that suit their special re-
quirements. It is nevertheless equally important to provide novel design and
modelling methodologies for these networks, in order to eﬃciently abstract
all aspects of WSNs.
1One such aspect is the notion of knowledge of the nodes in the net-
work. Since a WSN is a distributed information gathering system, it seems
natural to model and abstract what individual or groups of nodes in the
network know about the monitored area and about each other. With each
message received, or with each timeout for any expected message, nodes are
able to draw conclusions about either their neighbouring nodes, or the envi-
ronment in general. Those conclusions could thus enable nodes to develop
knowledge and beliefs not only about events occurring in the environment,
but also about the status of other nodes in their communication/sensing
group. Considering the knowledge developed by nodes during the network’s
operation, nodes can be viewed as knowledge agents and the network can
be modelled as a knowledge-theoretic multi-agent system. The contribution
of the work presented in this report, is the exploration of the potential of
adopting a knowledge theoretic abstraction for WSNs and their protocols,
and investigation of the advantages and drawbacks of this approach.
The rest of this report is organized as follows. Section 2 provides motiva-
tion in abstracting WSNs as knowledge theoretic systems. In section 3 some
basic notions of the methodology used in this work are given. Sections 4
and 5 examine a knowledge based data transmission protocol for WSN and
evaluate the protocol against standard data transmission protocols. The
report concludes with section 7, which includes a discussion for directions
of future research and a summary of contributions made.
2 Motivation
As it was pointed out by Stankovic et al. [11], few results have been recorded
for WSNs using analytical and formal models, thus providing a systematic
method for abstracting a WSN and its protocols. One way to model WSNs
and provide analytical results is by abstracting nodes as knowledge agents
and take into account their knowledge of various facts about the network.
To the best of the author’s knowledge, no attempt has yet been made to
explicitly examine, model, and provide appropriate data structures for repre-
senting nodes’ knowledge about their neighbours, including knowledge about
their neighbours’ knowledge and beliefs.
A node’s knowledge is an important resource that can eﬀect decision
making during run-time, and thus WSN protocols become more dynamic
and adjust to the state of knowledge of the nodes. Moreover, certain in-
formation that needs to be communicated under speciﬁc protocols might
already be known, and thus message exchange for that piece of informa-
tion is not necessary, hence saving battery power. It is also possible to
derive bounds for the number of messages exchanged to achieve a degree
of “knowledge quality”, such as a degree of conﬁdence for detecting events
in the environment, or percentage of neighbours for which certain facts are
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Figure 1: Analyzing SPs by creating KBPs
known. Furthermore, one could identify through oﬀ-line analysis what facts
need to be known by the nodes so that a speciﬁcation for a protocol is sat-
isﬁed, and thus design and verify the protocol according to the knowledge
of the nodes.
Having a representation of nodes’ knowledge under diﬀerent protocols
could also help in evaluating the protocols, in terms of under which protocol
nodes know more accurate facts, how many “unnecessary” messages are
being exchanged for information that is already known, and so on. Protocols
can also be compared by examining the knowledge of nodes and identifying
inconsistencies between what nodes believe about each other and their actual
state, or between the nodes’ perception of their environment and/or group
and the user’s beliefs.
An application of a knowledge-theoretic view of a WSN which has been
taken into consideration by the author in designing and examining a Knowl-
edge Based Protocol (KBP). In knowledge based programmes [8] (and proto-
cols) before an agent proceeds with an action, a knowledge test is performed.
Based on this principle, Standard Protocols (SP) for WSNs can be enhanced,
by adding an extra knowledge check level. Before certain actions take place,
a node checks its knowledge by performing a knowledge-test about a certain
fact. If the node cannot decide based on its knowledge, the standard test
of the protocol takes place. One could therefore potentially systematically
design and verify protocols by examining when is a SP veriﬁed, what knowl-
edge is thus required for the nodes, and how this knowledge can be gained
or transferred, thus creating a KBP. This process is outlined in Fig. 1.
In order for such a KBP to be designed, it is necessary to consider an
appropriate data structure, or a knowledge-model, that would allow nodes
to store and manipulate knowledge related facts. Such a model would have
to be large enough to capture all information necessary for the nodes to
evaluate their knowledge, but at the same time realistically small to be
stored and processed on memory and storage constrained nodes. This is a
challenging and interesting investigation, also due to the potential explosion
of alternative beliefs nodes could deduce based on such a model.
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3 Knowledge Theoretic Basics
Modelling and formalizing knowledge in various systems generally uses epis-
temic logic principles [3] which is a logic for reasoning about what agents
know and believe. Epistemic logic is used to analyse and model distributed
message passing systems and prove properties such as: the infeasibility
of simultaneous action under certain error conditions, the impossibility to
guarantee termination of knowledge-transfer protocols, and upper message
bounds for knowledge communication [3, 6]. This methodology has also
been used to verify and enhance various message transmission protocols [4],
including the Internet’s Transmission Control Protocol [12]. Epistemic logic
thus appears to be appropriate for abstracting WSN as knowledge-theoretic
systems.
3.1 Possible worlds structures
One of the fundamentals of epistemic logic is the notion of a world [5] an
agent considers possible in a system, according to a speciﬁc protocol. These
possible worlds are usually represented by graph-based Kripke structures
[7]. The vertices of a Kripke structure represent diﬀerent possible worlds,
and the edges correspond to accessibility relations showing which worlds the
agents consider indistinguishable. Moreover, it is trivially true that for any
agent, any world is indistinguishable to itself. Consider for example two
nodes 0 and 1 which exist in an environment with lossy communication.
The nodes follow a protocol such that whenever a node detects an event it
must broadcast a message. Assume that node 0 detected an event, but did
not receive a message from 1. There are thus two possible worlds considered
by node 0: w1 in which node 1 detected the event and its message was lost,
and w2 where 1 did not detect the event at all. The Kripke structure for
this system is shown in Fig.2.
43.2 Formulas
Epistemic logic uses the same operators and propositions as propositional
logic, with extra operators to express knowledge. Formulas consist of propo-
sitions p0,p 1,..., the operators ¬, ∧,∨, →, and the epistemic logic operators,
out of which only the knowledge operator is of relevance in this report: Ki,
agent i knows. An epistemic logic formula is deﬁned in a similar manner as
a propositional logic formula, with the addition that if ϕ i saf o r m u l a ,s oi s
Kiϕ, meaning that agent i knows ϕ.
When a formula holds in a world w of a model M the notation (M,w) |=
ϕ is used. Epistemic logic formulas are evaluated using the basic rules of
propositional logic; also Kiϕ is evaluated as: (M,w) |= Kiϕ if and only if
(M,w ) |= ϕ for all w  indistinguishable to w for agent i. Consider again
the example with nodes 0 and 1, and let p be the proposition “node 1
detected the event”. Since in w2 it is assumed that 1 did not detect the
event then (M,w 2)  |= p, but in w1,( M,w 1) |= p holds. Since both w1
and w2 are indistinguishable for 0, then in neither worlds K0p holds, thus
formalizing that node 0 does not know if 1 detected the event. If node 0
receives 1’s message, world w2 is not possible anymore and the only world
indistinguishable to w1 from node 0’s perspective is w1 itself. Therefore
(M,w 1) |= K0ϕ now holds.
4 Protocol Analysis
This section presents and discusses an example of a KBP for WSNs, inspired
by epistemic logic principles. The KBP implements a knowledge test on top
of a simple data transmission SP for WSNs. Both protocols and the network
assumptions are kept simple, since this work focuses on an experimental
approach.1 Also, the simplicity of the protocols enables the derivation of
evaluation results related more to the knowledge-theoretic part of the algo-
rithm which are less aﬀected by the details of the underlying protocol. The
goal of the design and implementation of this KBP, is to investigate: (i) if
knowledge-theoretic models can be used in sensor networks at run time, so
that nodes would make decisions evaluating their knowledge, (ii) if such a
knowledge-theoretic structure could be used to verify WSN protocols under
certain assumptions, (iii) what would the performance and overhead of a
simple KBP be, and (iv) how one could design a KBP based on a simple
SP for data transmission. The KBP is evaluated through experimental sim-
ulation against the SP and through analysis of the protocol overhead and
resource usage.
1Current research is concentrating in performing knowledge-theoretic analysis and en-
hancement to an actual WSN protocol, with more realistic network assumptions.
54.1 Network and protocol assumptions
The following properties were assumed for the WSN: a node has sensing,
communication, and processing units, and limited battery power. The net-
work consists of groups of nodes, and each group has several subgroups of N
nodes. Members of a subgroup are synchronized nodes that sleep and wake
up approximately at the same time. Moreover, nodes in a subgroup are
neighbours and are assumed to know each other’s unique IDs. Neighbouring
nodes have similar sensing and communication capabilities, meaning that all
nodes in a subgroup can detect an event and receive a message broadcasted
to the subgroup. Nodes have dual-radios [2, 9, 10] and can use a high power
radio for data packets, and a low power one for small control packets. Any
message can be lost with probability pm.
Nodes periodically wake up and monitor a speciﬁc value of the environ-
ment, for instance temperature. If a node senses a change in the value over
a threshold since the last time it took a measurement, it detects an event of
interest. It is assumed that nodes do not falsely identify non-existing events.
Moreover, an event lasts long enough for all nodes in a subgroup to detect it,
but a node could miss an event with probability pe. It is however assumed
that any event is always detected by at least one node in the subgroup.
To provide for battery savings, the detection quality is assumed to be
such that it is suﬃcient for one node to send a data message for an occurring
event.2 A data transmission protocol should hence satisfy the property that
for each occurring event, exactly one node in a subgroup sends a data packet
to a leader node: if no nodes transmit, the event not communicated, and if
more than one node sends a packet the overall battery of the subgroup is
needlessly reduced. Finally, to ensure that nodes consume energy at equal
rates, nodes take turns in sending data messages.
4.2 Standard protocol
Two diﬀerent versions of the SP were considered: a version where nodes
consume fewer resources and transmit data messages based on a ﬁxed order
(V1), and a second version (V2) where nodes listen for data message thus
adjusting the sending order. The SP does the following: if an event of
interest is detected, a node performs a standard test to decide based on an
increasing ID order, if it is its turn to transmit a data message.
It is quite clear, if an event is not detected by a node ni then the send-
ing order is jeopardized, since ni has a diﬀerent view than its neighbours of
when it is its turn to send. In the second version of the SP therefore, nodes
listen on the wireless channel for data message transmission and adjust the
2It is true that the message might be lost, but our main concern is to verify that a
protocol satisﬁes a given condition, and the protocols discussed can be expanded to satisfy
a condition saying that k>1 messages must be sent.
6sending order. If a node receives two or more data messages for an event, it
adjusts its order according to the data message whose sender had the highest
ID. Similarly, if a node both sent and received a data message for an event,
it only adjusts its perception of the order if the message received was sent
from someone with a higher ID. In some ways, this is a knowledge algorithm
where the nodes do not explicitly perform knowledge tests to make their
decisions.
The pseudocode for the two versions is the following:
First version (V1):
1 loop until battery runs out {
2 sleep for t time units
3 take measurement
4 if (value change ≥ threshold and standardTest()) send data message
5 }
Second version (V2):
1 loop until battery runs out {
2 sleep for t time units
3 receive data messages
4 adjust sending order
5 take measurement
6 if (value change ≥ threshold and standardTest()) send data message
7 }
When a node performs a standard test in lines 4 and 6 of V1 and V2 re-
spectively, it checks whether or not it is its turn to send according to the ID
based sending order.
4.3 Knowledge-based protocol
This sections discusses the reasoning behind the design of the KBP, and its
basic operation.
4.3.1 Reasoning of protocol design
The two versions of the SP cannot guarantee to satisfy the condition of one
message being sent for each event. In order for the ﬁrst version of SP to
be veriﬁed, it would be necessary for all nodes to detect all events. The
second version would be veriﬁed if: the node whose turn it is to transmit
always detects the event, and if a node that did not detect an event receives a
data message before its turn to transmit, thus properly adjusting its sending
order. Even though the veriﬁcation requirements for the second version does
not seem to be as strict as the requirements of the ﬁrst version, the second
version of the SP is quite resource consuming.
7A KBP is thus considered, taking into account what the nodes must know
so that the condition is satisﬁed, and trying to establish this knowledge us-
ing as few resources as possible. It was observed that to meet the protocol
condition of one data message being sent for each occurred event, it is suﬃ-
cient that: nodes in each subgroup which missed an event come to know, or
become aware that the event occurred, and thus the sending order is main-
tained. In the KBP therefore, when nodes detect an event they broadcast
a small Low Power Message (LPM). The small message contains only the
sender ID, the message number and the number of data messages the sender
transmitted so far.3
The LPM therefore is a mean for the nodes to communicate knowledge
between them. A node is aware of an event e if it either detected e,o ri t
became aware of e by receiving a LPM from some neighbour that identiﬁed
the event. Since it is assumed that any event e is detected by at least one
node, and if it is further presumed that nodes which did not detect e receive
at least one LPM, then all nodes are aware of e. The KBP thus appears
to be veriﬁed if a node which did not detect an event receives at least one
LPM. This requirement does not appear to be stricter than the veriﬁcation
requirements of the two versions of the SP.
Since battery power is a limited resource for nodes, a good design method-
ology for the WSN would be that nodes use their knowledge to decide who
should transmit the next data message, according to which node they be-
lieve has the most battery. A node ni therefore decides if a neighbour would
be the next sender based on what is knows about its neighbour’s battery
and if the neighbour under consideration also knows it should sent; there is
no point in deciding a neighbour will be the sender, if the neighbour itself
does not decide to transmit.
4.3.2 Protocol basics and pseudocode
In the KBP, nodes evaluate certain facts using a Kripke structure-based
knowledge model, which reﬂects all the possible realities (worlds) for the
subgroup up to the speciﬁc round of the KBP. Each world in the model is
assigned with a probability indicating how possible it is for that world to
be the reality. Nodes use the model to probabilistically decide who the next
sender is. The model is updated and the node changes its view of possible
realities as new information is learned through LPM reception, or when the
node is uncertain about the real state of its neighbours. New worlds are
created in the model when the node is uncertain if neighbours received a
LPM, detected an event, or transmitted a data message due to the possibility
of its decision about the next sender being wrong.
3The message number and the number of data messages are needed so that nodes can
identify the correct state of their neighbours and change the knowledge model accordingly.
8In each world considered in the knowledge-model, ni makes a world deci-
sion about the next sender, based on which neighbours it believes have the
most battery that could also decide to transmit. During the world decision
process, the decision function is recursively called for all other nodes in the
group. This way, ni uses knowledge about its neighbours’ knowledge to esti-
mate which of its neighbours would decide to transmit a data message. Out
of the neighbours ni believes could decide to transmit, and itself, the node
decides on the one with the most battery or the least ID if the batteries
are similar4. Finally, ni makes a world decision about itself if it meets the
battery criteria, or if it believes that no neighbour will decide on itself while
some neighbour would decide that ni should be the sender.
Once the node has made its world decisions, it makes an overall decision
based on the probabilities of the worlds it considers possible. An overall
decision is made, if in all worlds with probabilities over a certain threshold
the world decision is for the same node. If however there are at least two
high probability worlds in which diﬀerent nodes are decided, then the node
cannot make an overall decision. In such a case, the node being unable to
decide would simply fall back to the standard protocol and transmit based
on the sending order.
Finally, the KBP is designed assuming the following fault model: it is
not possible for any node to loose more than m LPMs transmitted for an
event e, for any node not to receive more than m  consecutive LPMs from
the same sender, for more than v nodes to miss an even, and for any node
to miss more than v  consecutive events.
The pseudocode of the KBP a node ni runs is:
1 loop until battery runs out {
2 sleep for t time units
3 take measurement
4 if (value change ≥ threshold) {
5 send and receive LPMs
6 eliminate impossible and create new worlds
7 sender node = ni.decision()
8i f ( sender node == ni) send data message // if ni decided itself
9i f ( sender node == null) {
// if no decision could be made
10 if (standardTest()) send data message
11 }
12 }
13 else {
// no event was detected
4Two nodes have similar batteries if the diﬀerence between their batteries is less than
a speciﬁed amount d. That amount d is such that two nodes are considered to have
non-similar batteries, only if they transmitted diﬀerent number of data messages.
914 receive LPMs
15 eliminate impossible and create new worlds
16 if (event missed) {
17 take measurement
18 sender node = ni.decision()
19 if (sender node == ni) send data message
20 if (sender node == null) {
21 if (standardTest()) send data message
22 }
23 }
24 }
25}
The function decision() operates as such:
1 for each world:
2 for each neighbour nj {
3 sender node = nj.decision()
4i f ( sender node == nj) add nj to list // get any node that decides itself
5 }
6 if (list is empty and there was sender node == ni) {
// no neighbour decided itself, but someone decided ni
7 world decision is ni
// ni decides itself
8 }
9 if (list is not empty) {
10 make world decision from nodes in list based on battery criteria
11 }
12 }
// overall decision follows
13 if (there is sender node so that sender node is world decision in
all high prob. worlds) {
14 overall decision = sender node
15 }
16 create decision uncertainty worlds
17 return overall decision
Note that in line 16 of the KBP, if a node comes to learn that it missed an
event e through LPM exchange, it proceeds in the same manner as if it has
actually detected e. Also, there is an inﬁnite recursion in the decision pseu-
docode, which is dealt with by introducing levels in the knowledge model,
discussed below.
4.3.3 Knowledge model structure
This section includes more details about the knowledge-model nodes use to
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Figure 3: Knowledge-tree structure used to model knowledge
evaluate formulas. The model consists of diﬀerent levels, such that each
level represents a depth of knowledge. Level 0 consists of level 0 worlds
corresponding to the perception of node ni which runs the KBP, about the
entire subgroup. In each such world, the neighbouring nodes are represented
by simulated node structures, which are in level 1 of the model. These
structures model ni’s view about each neighbour. To model diﬀerent views
about a neighbour nj, in each simulated node there are several level 1 worlds
that could be possible realities for the speciﬁc neighbour. In each level 1
world therefore the variables of nj, such as battery and number of messages
transmitted, are diﬀerent.
Since the KBP requires nodes to evaluate their neighbours’ knowledge
by estimating their neighbours’ decisions, it is necessary to model a node’s
perception about its neighbour’s perception. Therefore, each level 1 possible
world recursively includes level 2 simulated nodes. Each level 2 simulated
node thus models what the node believes about its neighbours’ perceptions
of their neighbours. Similar to level 1 worlds, for each level 2 simulated
node there are several level 2 possible worlds. Nonetheless, since it is not
necessary to further model neighbours’ views about their neighbours’ beliefs,
there is no need to include simulated node structures in level 2 worlds. The
model is thus a tree-structure restricted in three levels and it is suﬃcient
for capturing the depth of knowledge required by the KBP. The knowledge-
model is shown in Fig.3.
The terms used is this report are: node or actual node for the node that
exists in the network and stores the knowledge model, and intermediate and
leaf node for level 1 and level 2 simulated nodes respectively. When the
term simulated node is used, then both level 1 and 2 nodes are referred to.
11When saying that a simulated node nj “received/transmitted” a message or
“detected” an event e, it means that the actual node believes that the node
corresponding to nj received/transmitted the message or detected e.A l s o ,
when a simulated node nj is said to make a decision, this refers to what
the actual node believes nj’s decision would be based on nj’s knowledge.
Since leaf nodes however do not have knowledge about other nodes, are thus
assumed by default to always decide themselves as the sender. This also
serves as a way to deal with the inﬁnite recursion of the decision algorithm.
4.3.4 Knowledge-model updates: world creation and elimination
While the KBP runs and LPMs are being exchanged or lost, the knowledge-
model is updated so that worlds are created reﬂecting uncertainty about
the status of the group, and eliminated with the reception of new informa-
tion. This section describes in more detail the process of world creation
and elimination. A running example used in this section to demonstrate the
knowledge-update procedure is the example of nodes 0 and 1, mentioned in
section 3.1: nodes 0 and 1 monitor the environment for a value of interest,
and transmit a message whenever they detect an event (LPM). Throughout
the example it is assumed that it is the ﬁrst time the nodes run, and they
have equal batteries.
World creation
First and foremost, worlds where the fault model assumptions are violated,
are not created. However, the assumption that nodes are aware of each
event is not part of the fault model, and hence worlds in which a node is
not aware of an event could also exist.
Each new world is a copy of a world already in the model, in which
something diﬀerent has happened in the group. In the original world for
instance it might be assumed that a node received a message m, and that
in the new world m was lost. The world probabilities, and the simulated
node variables in the old and new worlds are updated accordingly, to reﬂect
the reality each world represents. New worlds are created in the following
situations.
LPM transmission/reception: When a node receives or sends a LPM, it
cannot know if the rest of the nodes in the group received the message.
New worlds for each simulated node nj are created, as a copy of each world
already assumed for nj. In the existing world w, nj’s variables are updated
to reﬂect the possibility of nj receiving the LPM. In the copy wc of w in
which nj is assumed to lost the LPM, nj’s variables do not change. Also, the
world probabilities are accordingly updated to reﬂect nj receiving or not the
LPM, based on pm: the initial world w in which the simulated node received
the LPM has probability P(w)=P(w)×(1−pm), and the copy wc where the
node is presumed to have lost the LPM has probability P(wc)=P(w)×pm.
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Simulated nodes that are assumed to have transmitted/received a LPM
recursively perform the same procedure, thus creating new level 2 worlds.
Consider the example with nodes 0 and 1, and assume that node 1 detects
an event and transmits a LPM. Node 1 however cannot know if node 0
received the LPM or not. The knowledge-model of node 1 after creating
worlds for LPM uncertainty is shown in Fig.4. There are two possible worlds
f o rn o d e0 :w o r l dw 
1 where it received the LPM from 1 (denoted by R(1))
and the copy of w 
1,w o r l dw 
2 in which the LPM was not received (denoted by
NR(1)). In world w 
1, the perception of node 0 for node 1 also changes, since
it knows that 1 has sent a LPM. In the level 2 world therefore representing
the diﬀerent realities for node 1 as seen by node 0, node 1 is assumed to have
transmitted a LPM (denoted by SentLPM). The changes in the model are
shown with bold face letters.
Event detected: When a node is aware of an event e it expects that its
neighbours having detected e will transmit a LPM. If it does not receive
LPMs from certain nodes after a timeout, it assumes that either the node
did not detect e, or that the LPM was lost. A copy wc of each world w
is created for each LPM not received, such that in wc it is assumed that
the neighbour nj did not detect e, whereas in w it is presumed that e was
detected and the LPM lost. In each w, the simulated node corresponding to
nj is updated to reﬂect the detection of e and the transmission of the LPM.
Again, the probabilities of w and wc reﬂect the possibility of the realities
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Figure 5: World creation for event detection uncertainty.
they correspond to: world w where the event was detected has probability
P(w)=P(w) × (1 − pe), and its copy wc where it is assumed that the
event was missed has probability P(wc)=P(w) × pe. All intermediate
nodes presumed to be aware of e also perform this procedure in order to
recursively create new worlds. New leaf node worlds, to account for nodes
detecting or missing an event are not created, since it is assumed that leaf
nodes do not have knowledge of any other nodes in the subgroup.
Continuing the example with nodes 0 and 1, assume that node 1 did not
receive a LPM from 0. Therefore, node 1 does not know if 0 detected the
event and the LPM was lost, or if 0 did not detect the event at all. The new
knowledge-model is shown in Fig.5. Node 1 in level 0 creates a new world
w2, in which it assumes that its neighbour node 0, did not detect the event.
In the initial world w1 therefore, it is presumed that node 0 detected the
event and sent a LPM which was lost. The number of possible lost LPMs
in w1 is thus 1. Consider intermediate node 0 in level 1, when it is assumed
to have detected the event (intermediate node in level 0 w1), and when it is
assumed to have missed the event (intermediate node in level 0 w2)
• Event detected (w1). To denote that node 0 detected the event, D
is included in all its level 1 worlds. Since the event was detected, if
14node 0 it did not received the LPM transmitted from its neighbour
node 1, it would not know if 1 detected the event or not. This reality
corresponds to w 
2. Node 0 would thus proceed in the same manner
to create event detection uncertainty worlds. A copy of w 
2 is thus
created, w 
3, in which node 0 would presume that its neighbour node
1 did not detect this event. In worlds w 
1 and w 
2 it is assumed that
node 1 detected the event, denoted by D in the possible level 2 worlds
of leaf node 1.
Moreover, it is assumed that node 0 transmitted a LPM which was
lost. It thus follows that node 0 not knowing if its neighbour node 1
received the LPM, would update its model in the manner shown in
Fig.4, and update the possible worlds for node 1. There are therefore
now two possible level 2 worlds for the leaf node: w  
1 where the LPM
was received, and w  
2 in which it is presumed that node 1 missed the
LPM.
• Event missed (w2). Level 1 worlds where it is assumed that node
0 did not detect the event are denoted by ND.I nw o r l dw 
1 where it
is assumed that node 0 receives the LPM sent by node 1, it becomes
aware that an event occurred. Node 0 would thus change its perception
for its neighbour node 1, since it now knows that 1 detected an event.
This is shown by including D in the level 2 worlds considered possible
for node 1, by node 0. Finally, if node 0 both misses the event, and
the LPM transmitted from node 1, corresponding to world w 
2, then
no changes happen.
Decision uncertainty: Since a node makes probabilistic decisions about the
next sender, it cannot be 100% conﬁdent that the decisions it makes are
correct. Therefore, worlds must be created to reﬂect this uncertainty. When
the actual node decides on itself, it does not create such worlds since it
is certain that it will transmit a data message. For each simulated node
nj nonetheless which decided to send a data message, new worlds should
be created which correspond to a reality where the decision about nj is
wrong and thus no data message is sent. In the worlds where the decision is
presumed correct, nj’s variables change to reﬂect the fact that it transmitted
a data message, and in the worlds where the decision is assumed wrong the
variables remain the same. For each world w therefore where the world
decision of nj was itself, a new world wc is created assuming the decision
was wrong and thus the node respective to nj does not transmit a data
message. World probabilities are accordingly updated depending on the
probabilities of the decisions being wrong or right, and whether the overall
decision made was also for nj. Worlds that reﬂect wrong decisions always
have lower probabilities than those that reﬂect right decisions. Consider
P(DwW)a n dP(DwR) to denote the probabilities of a world decision being
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Figure 6: Decision making.
wrong and right respectively. Similarly, let P(ODW)a n dP(ODR) be the
probabilities of an overall decision being wrong and right.5 The possible
worlds of an intermediate node are updated in the following manner:
• If the overall decision made by the intermediate node nj was itself,
then for each level 1 world w where the world decision was also nj,a
new world wc is created. In wc it is assumed that the world decision
was wrong, and subsequently the overall decision must also be wrong.
The probability by which the intermediate node is not the sender in
wc is P(wc)=P(w)P(DwW|ODW). This reﬂects the probability of
the real world being w, but the decision made in w being wrong, given
that the overall decision is also wrong. The probability of the original
world, in which it is assumed that the decisions are right is similarly
calculated to be P(w)P(DwR|ODR).
• If the overall decision of nj was not itself, new worlds are still cre-
ated for each world w where the world decision was nj. In the new
5Details about how these probabilities are omitted because they are outside of the
scope of this report.
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Figure 7: World creation for decision uncertainty.
worlds that are created it is again assumed that the world decision
was wrong. However, this time it is implied that the overall decision
must be correct and thus nj indeed is not the sender. In the original
worlds where the world decision is assumed right, it is implied that the
overall decision must be wrong. The new world wc therefore in which
nj is not the sender, has probability of P(wc)=P(w)P(DwW|ODR).
With the same reasoning, the probability of the original world w is
P(w)=P(w)P(DwR|ODW).6
This world creation process is shown in Fig.6 and 7. Continuing the example
with nodes 0 and 1, Fig.6 shows the world and overall decisions that would
have been made. Leaf nodes always decide on themselves since they are
assumed to have no knowledge about other nodes in the group. Also, notice
that in worlds where nodes are not aware of the event, meaning they neither
detected the event nor received a LPM, no decisions are made. Since it is
assumed that both nodes have the same battery, the one with the least ID,
node 0, is eventually chosen to be the sender. Fig. 7 shows the creation of
worlds for intermediate node 0, which reﬂect decision uncertainty. Also, the
ﬁgure does not show level 2 since there are no changes made in that level.
As it is shown, a copy has been created for all level 1 worlds where the world
decision was node 0. In the initial worlds it is assumed that the decision is
6If nj could not make an overall decision at all, then P(w)=P(w)P(DwR)a n d
P(wc)=P(w)P(DwW).
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Figure 8: Decision making.
correct and node 0 sent a data message, whereas in the copies it is presumed
that the decision was wrong and thus no data message was sent.
Since leaf nodes always decide themselves, if the above mentioned algo-
rithm is used decision uncertainty leaf node worlds would be created in each
round of the KBP, which would not be very eﬃcient. Therefore, decision
uncertainty leaf node worlds are created only when a leaf nj exists in a level
1w o r l dw, such that the world decision of its parent in w was nj. This is
illustrated in ﬁgures 8 and 9 which show the model for node 0, reversing
the roles of the nodes: it is assumed that node 0 detected the event and no
LPM was received from node 1.
Fig. 8 again shows the world and overall decisions. In Fig. 9 however,
decision uncertainty level 2 worlds are created only where the world decision
of intermediate node 1 was for node 0. Some structures are omitted from
the model, but they are updated in a similar manner as it is shown in the
ﬁgure.
World elimination
When a node receives information that proves certain worlds to be impos-
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Figure 9: Level 2 world creation for decision uncertainty.
sible, those worlds are eliminated. A world is considered impossible when a
LPM received indicates that the perception for the sender node in that world
is wrong. In each world it is presumed that the sender transmitted a certain
number of LPMs, and thus the next LPM expected to be received should
have a number m. If the LPM received has a diﬀerent number, worlds in
which m was expected are eliminated. This nevertheless does not eliminate
worlds where the LPM sender is assumed to have non-similar battery than
the battery the node actually has. Since nodes are assumed to have dissim-
ilar batteries only if they send a diﬀerent number of data messages, and a
LPM also includes a counter for the number of data messages transmitted by
the sender of the LPM, then all worlds in which the node is presumed to have
transmitted a diﬀerent number of data messages messages are eliminated.
Assume for instance that in the running example with nodes 0 and 1,
node 1 receives a LPM from 0 indicating that it has sent 1 data message.
Moreover, let the LPM number be 2. It is thus implied that node 0 did in
fact previously detect an event and sent a LPM with number 1 which was
lost. It is also clear that the decision of node 0 being the sender was correct.
Any worlds which are not compatible with this information are eliminated,
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as it is shown in Fig. 10.
If however the model is to be 100% precise and have a world for every
possibility for the subgroup, then the model would be very large even with
world elimination, since LPMs can be lost. On the other hand, it is necessary
to consider all likelihoods for the state of the subgroup to enable nodes to
make informed decisions. A solution to this problem is to identify sets of
similar worlds, and keep one world for each set. In two similar worlds, even
though they represented unique realities, the decision the node makes about
the next sender is the same.7
Two worlds w1 and w2 of an actual node at level 0 are considered to be
similar if and only if both of the following are true:
1. Respective children simulated nodes in both worlds, have either both
detected the current event e, or neither detected e.
2. The worlds of respective children simulated nodes are also similar: for
each possible world of the simulated node nj in w1, there is a similar
world for the respective n 
j in w2 and vice versa.
7This however does not mean that if two worlds are not similar, then necessarily
diﬀerent decisions are made.
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When considering worlds of a simulated node, in order for two worlds
w 
1 and w 
2 to be similar, all of the following must be true:
1. The prementioned criteria about the node’s children nodes must hold.
2. In both w 
1 and w 
2 the simulated node has similar batteries.
3. In both w 
1 and w 
2 then node is either aware of the current event e,o r
is not aware of e in neither of the worlds.
Finally, since leaf nodes do not have children in the model, only points 2
and 3 of the conditions for simulated node worlds must hold in order for two
leaf node worlds to be similar, meaning the leaf must have similar batteries
and be aware of e in both worlds. Checking and eliminating similar worlds
takes place before making any decisions.
Continuing the running example, assume for simplicity that the check for
similar worlds happens after the elimination shown in Fig.10. Notice that
the event detection uncertainty reﬂected in the model, is for a previous event
for which a data message was sent. It thus follows that whether worlds are
similar or not, is not aﬀected by the event detection uncertainty shown in
the model. Starting from level 2, all the worlds of any leaf node 1 are similar
between them since node 1 has similar battery values in all of them. The
updated model thus far is shown in Fig.11. The level 2 worlds that remain
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are those with the highest probability. Notice that all level 1 worlds are also
similar between them: in all worlds intermediate node 0 has similar battery
values, and the respective leaf nodes also have similar worlds. Therefore, as
it is shown in Fig.12 only the highest probability world w 
1 remains.
4.3.5 Decision making details
This section provides some more details about the process of decision mak-
ing, and includes the knowledge-theoretic formulas that are evaluated during
this process.
Assuming the formula ϕnj = “node nj will transmit a data message”, a
node ni checks if Kniϕnj (where ni and nj could be the same node) holds
with a certain probability p in the knowledge model. This corresponds to ni
making an overall decision that node nj should be the next sender. An over-
all decision about a node nj essentially means that node ni considers that
no matter what the reality is, node nj is probabilistically the next sender. If
a node decides itself (ni = nj) it transmits a data message. If however the
node is not able to decide which is the next sender, it performs the standard
test and sends a data message if it is its turn to transmit according to the
22ID-based order. In order for node ni to probabilistically evaluate Kniϕnj,
is checks if ϕnj holds in worlds of the model whose probability is over a
threshold pw.W h e nϕnj holds in a world, corresponds to the node making
a world decision that nj would be the next sender. This captures that node
ni considers that if the reality is the one corresponding to a certain world,
then the sender would be node nj.
In order for ϕnj to hold in a world w, the perception of ni for nj when
considering w, must be such that nj satisﬁes an eligibility criterion, which
can be anything from node nj is the nearest to an observed target, to nj
detected an event for the longest time.In this work, the eligibility criterion
is node nj has the most battery, thus designing the protocol to maximize
the network’s useful lifetime. It is therefore necessary for formula Bnj>nl
=“ nj has more battery than nl”t ob ee v a l u a t e di nw. If there is no node
with the most battery then the next node to transmit is chosen based on an
equal battery criterion. In this design, from the nodes with similar battery
values (which are more than the battery values of other neighbours) the one
with the smallest ID is decided to be the next sender. Thus, evaluation of
formulas Bnj=nl and IDnj<nl meaning “nj and nl have similar batteries”
and “ nj has a smaller ID than nl” respectively, are also needed to evaluate
ϕnj.
Another necessary condition that needs to be satisﬁed so that ϕnj holds
in w is that node ni can estimate that nj itself decides with a speciﬁc
probability that it is the sender. This subsequently means that Knjϕnj must
hold in w. Therefore, the formula ϕnj is also probabilistically evaluated
in level 1 possible worlds of intermediate node nj. Moreover, since it is
assumed that nodes can miss events, the formula will only be evaluated in
worlds where nj is presumed to be aware of the current event. Thus ϕnj
is evaluated only in worlds where either Dnje =“nj detected event e”o r
Anje=“nj became aware of event e” holds.
If ni itself meets the battery criteria in a world w, then ϕni holds and the
world decision is for itself. A node can also decide itself in w if it believes
that no neighbour would transmit, but some other node decided that ni
should be the next sender. Using knowledge-theoretic formulas, this means
that there is no nj for which Kniϕnj holds, but there is at least one node nl
such that KniKnlϕni.
Putting it all together, the knowledge model is used by a node ni to prob-
abilistically evaluate the formula Kniϕnj. The formula ϕnj must hold in cer-
tain worlds, which requires that KniKnjϕnj and KniBnj>nl,o rKniBnj=nl
and KniIDnj<nl, also hold. In order to decide if Knjϕnj holds, it is neces-
sary to only consider worlds where either KniDnje or KniAnje hold as well.
Finally, ϕni evaluates to true in a world w,i fni satisﬁes the sender criteria,
or if no node is found such that Kniϕnj holds, but KniKnlϕni holds for some
node nl.
235 Protocol evaluation
Evaluation of the KBP was made through experimental simulation and oﬀ-
line analysis of the protocol resource usage and memory/storage overhead.
5.1 Experimental simulation
The main goal of the experimental simulation is to test whether such a KBP
could be implemented, so that nodes make decisions based on a knowledge-
model. The implementation thus provides an additional research level and
helps to validate the theory behind the KBP. Moreover, the results serve as
an indication of the eﬃciency of the KBP as compared with the two versions
of the SP, in terms of resource usage and information communication.
5.1.1 Simulation parameters
The protocols were implemented in Java, for a WSN with one group and
one subgroup consisting of 3 nodes. The small number of nodes in the
simulation does not negatively aﬀect the evaluation: it was desired to test
if each node could evaluate a knowledge model and make decisions. Under
the KBP nodes behave similarly no matter what N is. This implementation
corresponds to simulating a WSN of any size, with any number of groups
consisting of subgroups of 3 nodes.
Certain test cases were considered, to demonstrate the KBP’s function
and prove the operational feasibility of such a knowledge-theoretic frame-
work. In all cases it is assumed that an event e is detected by at least one
node, and if a node does not identify e, it receives at least one LPM. The
results presented here are obtained from several test cases where events and
messages were randomly missed, according to the fault model.
All values of the fault model in the implementation were set to 2, besides
m which was set to 1. The following costs were assumed for message com-
munication: the cost to transmit a LPM, ltr, was 1 battery unit, the cost
to receive a LPM, lrec, was 0.5 units, the cost to transmit a data message,
dtr, was 10 units, and 5 units to receive a data message, drec. Nodes were
assumed to initially have 100 battery units. The simulation would run until
all nodes would exhaust their battery. Battery usage was modelled such
that energy is consumed only for communication, since the main diﬀerence
between the protocols was the number of messages communicated. The ef-
fects of protocol overhead in terms of processing cost were not studied in
the simulation. Nevertheless, some analytic results about the overhead of
the KBP are given in a following section.
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5.1.2 Results
The simulation results showed that nodes successfully maintained the knowl-
edge model and made decisions based on their knowledge. For all test cases,
when a node running the KBP missed an event e, it became aware of e
through LPM reception. Hence, if ni was the sender node according to the
sending order it would decide itself, and subsequently transmit a data mes-
sage. Any other node was able to decide that ni was the sender and thus just
one data message was sent for each event occurred. Under the ﬁrst version
of the SP nodes could not identify if they, or a neighbour, missed an event
and thus the sending order is jeopardized. It was noticed that event non-
communication can propagate: the perception of the sending order of each
node can change such that some events are never communicated. Therefore,
even if nodes actually miss few events, quite many are not communicated.
Moreover, even when running the second version of the protocol, several
events were not communicated since the node whose turn it was to transmit
could miss the event.
Fig.13 shows the average distinct messages8 transmitted to events oc-
curred ratio for all three protocols. This ratio measures the eﬀectiveness
of the protocol in terms of communicating information for each event that
has occurred in the network. As expected, the KBP is more eﬃcient in
communicating unique pieces of information about occurring events. The
ﬁrst version of the SP performs the worst, since there is no communication
between the nodes and the sending order cannot be re-established.
A drawback of the KBP is that nodes consume more battery than in the
ﬁrst version of the SP, due to LPM communication. Nonetheless, the total
battery of all nodes in the group reduces gracefully under the KBP, whereas
the reduction is unpredictable and under the SP. With the KBP the user
can be sure about the relative battery units of the nodes at any point in the
8Data messages are distinct if just one node sent a data message. In any round where
two or more messages are sent, the number of distinct data messages is one.
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run. Fig.14 shows the average total battery under the three protocols for 15
occurred events.
Considering moreover the total energy consumed to distinct data mes-
sages sent ratio shown in Fig.15, it is shown that even though the KBP is
more energy consuming, it is similar to the ﬁrst version of the SP in terms
of energy being eﬃcient consumed for sending distinct data messages. The
second version of the SP has the worst performance for this metric, since it
consumes the most energy to communicate distinct data messages.
5.2 Analytic evaluation
This section includes analytic results about the performance of the KBP,
obtained through oﬀ-line analysis. Through this analysis it is investigated
if in fact the KBP can be veriﬁed, the eﬀects of the LPM communication
in resource consumption, and the protocol overhead due to the size of the
knowledge-model.
265.2.1 Protocol veriﬁcation
As it was previously mentioned, in all test cases the KBP was veriﬁed and
exactly one node would sent a data message for each event that occurred.
Even though this behaviour was recorded only for the test cases ran, it can
in fact be proven that the KBP is veriﬁed, under the assumptions that all
nodes are aware of all events.
Theorem 1 Under the KBP, if actual nodes are aware of all events, then
whenever a node/intermediate node ni makes an overall decision that node
nj is the next sender, then according to the sending order it is indeed nj’s
turn.
The proof of Theorem 1 is in the Appendix.
Theorem 2 Under the KBP, if actual nodes are aware of all events, then
for each event only one node transmits a data message.
Proof Assume any event e and a node ni whose turn it is to transmit a
data message according to the sending sequence. If ni makes an overall
decision, then according to Theorem 1 it will decide itself and transmit a
data message for e.I fni could not make an overall decision, it will perform
the standard test. Since it is indeed its turn to send a data message, then
it will do so. Consider any other node nj, and assume that nj makes an
overall decision about event e. According to Theorem 1 ,nj also decides ni
and thus nj does not transmit. And ﬁnally, assume that nj could not make
an overall decision and performs a standard test. Then, it will not transmit
a data message since it is not its turn to send yet. Thus, for any event e,
one node transmits a data message. 
The KBP protocol is thus veriﬁed only if all nodes become aware of all
events. This requirement is not very strict, since it is met if a node that
missed an event receives at least one LPM. Nevertheless, this might fail in
a real WSN. It is therefore interesting and part of future work to examine
the probability with which such a KBP would be veriﬁed, assuming more
realistic message loss models in the network.
5.2.2 Resource usage
One of the drawbacks of the KBP compared with the ﬁrst version of the
SP, is that it nodes consume further energy to communicate LPMs. It is
possible nevertheless to guarantee a minimum number of events that are
communicated under the KBP, by either selecting an appropriate number of
nodes per subgroup, or by adjusting the cost to receive and transmit LPMs.
For this analysis it is assumed that no events or LPMs are missed, since
in this case the nodes running the KBP consume the most battery. For each
27event that has occurred in the network, nodes consume ltr +( N − 1)lrec
battery units to transmit and receive LPMs. Assume that the events have
unique IDs so that the ﬁrst event has ID 1, and the kth event has ID k.
Let node nl be the node that communicates the last event with ID Le.
Assuming initial B battery units, if the battery consumption of nl after it
communicated Le, is less or equal to B, it is guaranteed that at least Le
events are communicated. With the KBP therefore,

Le
N

dtr + Le[ltr +( N − 1)lrec] ≤ B
must hold, where
Le
N

is the total number of data messages transmitted by
nl. For example, if it is required that in the KBP at least 20 events are
communicated and keeping B = 100, n =3 ,a n ddtr = 10, then ltr +2lrec ≤
1.8. A bound for the number of nodes per subgroup can also be calculated:
if B = 100, dtr =5 ,ltr =0 .2, lrec =0 .1, and Le = 60 then 5 ≤ N ≤ 10.
If a subgroup has more that 10 nodes, then further battery is consumed for
receiving LPMs. On the other hand, if there are less than 5 nodes in the
subgroup, the nodes transmit a data message more often. In both cases, the
nodes’ batteries will be exhausted before 60 events are communicated.
Equations relating the costs to communicate LPMs and the reception
cost of data messages can also be provided, to guarantee that under the
KBP nodes will not consume more battery than when running the second
version of the SP. In the second version of the SP, for each event occurred in
the network nodes consume at least further drec battery units for receiving
the data message transmitted. Therefore, when
drec ≥ ltr +( N − 1)lrec
or when
N ≤
drec − ltr + lrec
lrec
it can be guaranteed that for each event detected, nodes running the KBP
cannot consume more battery that when running the second version of the
SP.
The choice of the subgroup size and the radio model are thus critical
for the network resource usage of the KBP. An appropriate choice can sig-
niﬁcantly prolong the nodes’ lifetime, and subsequently network usefulness.
It is thus possible to investigate the optimal combination of number of the
subgroup members and maximum LPM communication cost possible, that
will result to the maximum network lifetime.
5.2.3 Protocol overhead: knowledge-model size
The size of the knowledge model is key for the implementation and analysis
of the KBP. It is crucial to ensure that nodes have suﬃcient memory to
28Table 1: Maximum world bounds when N =3
Parameters World Bounds
Level 0 Level 1 Level 2
v =1 m =1
m  =2 21 24
m  =4 83 06
v =2
m =0
m  =2 134
m  =4 146
m =1
m  =2 61 64
m  =4 54 40 6
store and process the model used. Furthermore, by obtaining a bound on
the number of worlds, diﬀerent models can be compared to identify the
minimum size of the model for which the nodes come to know the same
facts, and can eﬀectively make the same decisions. By eliminating impossible
and similar worlds the number of worlds in the model can be bounded. It
has been observed that after certain LPMs have been received, the model
stabilizes to a speciﬁc number of worlds, meaning that all worlds considered
for all nodes stabilize to a minimum number. When LPMs are missed the
number of worlds increase, but are re-stabilized again after LPM receptions.
It is nonetheless more interesting to provide the bounds for the maximum
number of worlds in each level of the knowledge model, as calculated for
various fault models. Detailed equations used to derive the minimum and
maximum world bounds are not be provided in this report, but are available.
Worlds are maximized when nodes have the most uncertainties for both
event detection and for nodes’ batteries, subsequently maximizing the num-
ber of non-similar worlds that cannot be eliminated. The maximum worlds
at level 0 are created when the node continuously detects events, but does
not receive any LPMs. The worlds keep increasing until the round where
m  LPMs are not received, since according to the fault model no more than
m  consecutive LPMs may not be received by a node, from any neighbour.
The following tables summarize the maximum bounds for worlds con-
sidered for one node, in the three levels of the knowledge model for various
parameters of the fault model. The parameters were chosen to reﬂect combi-
nations of the following: at least one node must detect an event (v = N −1),
at least half the nodes detect an event (v =  N
2  ), half of the maximum
number of LPMs that can be transmitted for an event must be received
(m = N − 1 −  N−1
2  ), and the minimum number of LPMs that can be
sent must be received (m = N − 1 − v). The values for m  were chosen to
correspond to networks with low and high error rates. The calculations were
made for a subgroup of 3 nodes corresponding to the experimental simula-
tion, and a subgroup of 10 nodes which reﬂects a more realistic number of
nodes.
29Table 2: Maximum world bounds when N =1 0
Parameters World Bounds
Level 0 Level 1 Level 2
v =5 m =4
m  =2 126 1464 4
m  =4 1263 5856 4
v =9
m =0
m  =2 13 4
m  =4 14 4
m =4
m  =2 131 × 256 1984 4
m  =4 131 × 2563 7936 4
It is generally observed that the number of worlds in each level either
increases with the number of nodes in each subgroup, or remains the same
according to the rest of the fault model parameters. The only time where
the number of worlds decreases with a higher N is when calculating level
2 worlds for m  = 4. This is justiﬁed considering that leaf node worlds
increase when the intermediate parent nodes make world decisions about
the leafs. For N = 10, at least 10 rounds must pass for the leaf node worlds
to further increase and this is not the case when m  =4 .A si ti sm o r e o v e r
expected, the stricter the fault model, meaning as v and m decrease, worlds
are reduced. However, diﬀerent combinations of v and m provide diﬀerent
results. For example, when N =3 ,v = 2 and m = 0, there are fewer level
0 worlds rather than when v = 1 and m = 1. This is explained considering
that even if fewer worlds exist due to event detection uncertainty, when
m = 0 only the world where no messages were lost remains.
It is crucial to note that the calculation of the world bounds is quite
pessimistic which is one reason why in some cases the bound is quite a
large number. Future work can concentrate on deriving and proving tighter
bounds for the size of the model. In this work for instance, the eﬀect of not
allowing more than v  consecutive events not to be detected by any node,
has not been fully investigated in terms of how the model size is aﬀected.
It can also be investigated whether the knowledge model, or the conditions
under which worlds are eliminated ,can change so that the model’s size can
be further reduced. For instance, it could be suﬃcient to use a smaller model
that will enable nodes to decide that someone else will send a data message,
and not necessarily who will send. Also, latest research suggests that if the
model is changed so that decision uncertainty worlds are not created, and
the fault model incorporates that all nodes become aware of all events then
it is possible to have a constant number of maximum worlds for all rounds.
Nevertheless, it appears that it might not be such a good design policy
for the nodes to maintain and evaluate a full-scale knowledge model at run
time. An attractive alternative would be to perform protocol analysis oﬀ-
line using a knowledge-theoretic model, and use the results to enhance the
30protocol. The nodes would not need to use a knowledge model at run time
and thus save precious space and memory. Another solution would be to
deﬁne light-weight knowledge-models that would store less information but
be eﬃcient enough for nodes to make knowledge-based decisions at run time.
5.2.4 Evaluation discussion
Comparing the results of the evaluation with the goals set in section 4, the
following are observed. Through the use of knowledge theoretic methodolo-
gies, it is possible to develop a KBP based on a SP, where nodes evaluate
a knowledge model at run time. The KBP can improve the performance
of the network in terms of information transfer but with increased energy
consumption. For all test cases the KBP was veriﬁed and the condition
met, under the considered assumptions of event detection. The assumptions
though required for protocol veriﬁcation might not hold in a real WSN, and
it would be interesting to consider probabilistic veriﬁcation. Moreover, quite
a large overhead is associated with the model used in the KBP. More eﬃ-
cient models for knowledge manipulation would thus be a possible area of
future work.
6 Contributions and future work
This report discusses a possible new knowledge-theoretic design methodol-
ogy for WSN protocols. Inspired by principles of epistemic logic an example
KBP for WSNs was developed, as a means to explore and investigate the
advantages and potential drawbacks of this approach. It is shown that even
though the KBP can improve the performance of the network, a serious
criticism of the protocol is the potential large size of the knowledge-model
used, since WSN nodes are severely memory and storage constrained. This
demonstrates a possible disadvantage of KBPs for WSNs.
Ongoing research focuses on further examination on the size of the knowl-
edge model and the number of worlds. Tighter world bounds are currently
being investigated, as well as the physical cost to store one world structure.
Alternative light-weight models for representing knowledge are also being
considered, as well as means to further decrease the size of the knowledge
model but still enable nodes to correctly evaluate formulas and gain knowl-
edge of certain facts.
Another potential alternative would be to perform oﬀ-line knowledge-
theoretic analysis of a protocol and use the results to enhance protocol per-
formance. This eliminates the need to maintain a possibly large knowledge-
model during run time. Future work thus concentrates on performing such
oﬀ-line analysis for existing and more complex WSN protocols. Part of that
research will also examine whether knowledge required for the protocol to be
31veriﬁed can be achieved. Eventually, a general knowledge-theoretic frame-
work is envisioned that will serve as an alternative, or a complement, to other
means of systematic WSN protocol design. Such a framework will enable
designers to methodically develop WSN protocols, and explore tradeoﬀs be-
tween protocol performance, resource consumption, and knowledge related
overhead.
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A Proof of Theorem 1
Theorem 1 Under the KBP, if actual nodes are aware of all events, then
whenever a node/intermediate node ni makes an overall decision that node
nj is the next sender, then according to the sending order it is indeed nj’s
turn.
Proof Theorem 1 is proven with induction on the number d of overall de-
cisions ni makes.
Base case: d =1 . Since ni made a decision, the world decisions in all
high probability worlds (HPWs) were for the same node. Because d =1 ,n o
node is assumed to have sent a data message, and all nodes in the KT have
similar batteries. Thus, all world and overall decisions are for node nj with
the least ID. Since the actual node is aware of all events in the network,
this decision process is initiated for the ﬁrst event that occurred and hence
according to the sending order it is indeed nj’s turn to transmit.
Inductive Step: assuming the claim holds for the dth decision, prove the
claim for the (d +1 ) th decision. At the dth overall decision about node nj
for event e , world decisions in all HPWs were for nj. Assume those worlds
are in a set S. (i) Let the d + 1 decision be for the event e occurring in
the network after e . In all current HPWs including those in S, the same
world decision is made. It is thus trivially true that the next decision will
be for the node nj, next in the sending order after nj. According to the
Induction Hypothesis, nj which was chosen during the dth decision was
indeed the node that sent a data message for event e , and the node that
should transmit for e is the next in the sending order, which is nj. (ii) If
between the dth and the (d +1 ) th decision there are events for which ni
could not make an overall decision, in all worlds in S the world decisions for
each event after e  would still be for the nodes following the sending order
after nj. According to the Induction Hypothesis, nj was indeed the sender
node for e , and since the decision process is initiated for all events in the
network, in the worlds in S the correct world decision is made. Since an
overall decision was made for e, then either HPWs with inconsistent world
33decisions were eliminated, or their world decisions changed. Hence, in all
HPWs that remain the world decisions are for the same node. Since it is
certain that the worlds in S which reﬂect the correct battery status of the
group remain, and that they have high probabilities, all world decisions of
the HPWs are the same as the world decisions made in worlds in S, which
will be for node nj next in the sending order. Subsequently, the overall
decision will be for nj.
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